The recent rediscovery of the value of values.
Lessons for the schools.

Mark Elchardus
TOR, vakgroep sociologie
Vrije Universiteit Brussel
(Free University of Brussels)

(preliminary version)

In 1971 Lautmann waded through the professional literature, in search for the meaning of 'value'. He listed no less than 178 definitions. The highest common denominator of these is very small: values are factors which influence judgements about what is good, fine, just, true or beautiful, and can therefore influence action. Even the relevance of such minimally defined values is called into question by many social scientists. They maintain that the influence of values is only apparent. If such influence is discerned, then according to them it is not genuine, because values themselves are in turn completely determined by other, more fundamental, material factors. According to these authors we should attach little importance to values, or even better, remain entirely silent on the subject.

Their attitude proceeds from a specific view of the motives of action. This assumes that people always act out of self-interest. This is the belief on which the neo-classical (economic) theories, as well as the sociological exchange, and Rational Choice theories are based[1]. These theories rest on the assumption that everyone ultimately aims at the same general goals: avoiding pain and maximising pleasure. Each specific goal is a means of achieving a further objective, ultimately to maximise a final goal which is so general and obvious that it neither can nor need to be justified. In *Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* Hume expressed this as follows: "Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer because he desires to keep his health. If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your inquiries further and desire a reason, why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any" (op.cit. Alexander, 1982, vol.1: 73). In this way human action is seen as ultimately determined by pain and pleasure. In the light of this belief values are considered suspicious. 'Peace, 'equality, 'freedom, 'honesty', etc. can only be the means by which the real goals lying behind such noble ideals are striven for. Those high-sounding and noble values are considered a smoke-screen behind which people hide their true intentions and interests for strategic or possibly perfidious reasons. At best values can be considered as a sort of irrationality or self-delusion that prevent people to pursue their real interests (Boudon, 1981:186).

That rational-utilitarian approach is not only used to explain the behaviour of individuals in a given situation or social context. It is also applied to the development of this context itself (Coleman, 1990). The development of institutions, the growth of customs, the nature of technological and legal rules, are also explained in a rational-utilitarian way. Thus Harris (1985) sees in dietary rules (for example, the prohibition on eating pork) a consequence of a slowly-produced, but rational and therefore

---

[1] For a clarification of the basic assumptions of these theories, see Elster, 1984: 1-33.

predictable, adaptation to the availability and suitability for storage of various types of food (compare with the contrasting explanation in Douglas, 1973).[2]

As utilitarian inspired, rational choice theory caught on in different social sciences in the seventies and early eighties, the term 'value' fell out of favour. It was considered old-fashioned and naïve and therefore avoided. In the last decade this has changed again. Jim McGuigan (1991) who has written a very interesting history of British cultural populism, attributes the ultimate failure of that school to its inability to deal with values. The study of culture and the study of values are, according to McGuigan, inextricably linked to each other. "In short, the study of culture is nothing if it is not about values. A disenchanted, anti-moralistic, anti-judgmental stance constructed in opposition to cultural and political zealotry only takes you that far. The posture may be cool, detached and irreverent but it is not value-free" (1991:173).

1. Why are values coming back?

The recent rediscovery of values has a variety of causes and presents itself in different forms. It is useful to list a number of these. They immediately provide an overview of the expectations that today are attached to values and therefore to values education.

Illustrative of the route that has led a number of authors to the rediscovery of values and culture, is the work of Francis Fukuyama. In 1989 he published an essay *The End of History*, which defended the proposition that history, in its Hegelian sense, had ended and humanity had definitively opted for democracy and capitalism. Almost everywhere in the world that essay inspired enthusiasm for a global, neo-liberal economy. In 1995 Fukuyama published *Trust*, a book that, as the sub-title states, deals with the role of social virtues in the creation of prosperity. This book accuses neo-liberalism and its neo-classical economic foundation of gross incompleteness. Well-being and economic success are, according to Fukuyama, based to a important extent on cultural conditions. They are dependent on the extent to which a culture has available the values and standards which make it possible for the individual to trust others and subject personal interests to collective interests. "The liberal democracy that emerges at the end of history" writes Fukuyama, "is therefore not entirely 'modern'. If the institutions of democracy and capitalism are to work properly, they must coexist with certain pre-modern cultural habits that ensure their proper functioning. Law, contract, and economic rationality provide a necessary but not sufficient basis for both the stability and prosperity of post-industrial societies; they must as well be leavened with reciprocity, moral obligation, duty towards community, and trust, which are based in habit rather than calculation. The latter are

---

[2] There are various sorts of reducing values to calculated interest or subjective preference. Herrnstein Smith (1988: 90-97) that speaks of the "social value of values", but I am unable to reduce the difference. If other values have a function because people can afford try everything out for them, prices and motivation so far, so far as it in their value judgements of others. Examples of socially useful values for her are the guidelines given to hikers, travel guides, and art criticism (1988: 98-99). Values are therefore commodities. Therefore Herrnstein Smith derives no escape from the economy (1988: 112). By this she means that the value of something can only be determined by offering it on a market. Of the arguments that she develops in her book, she writes consistently that she is "offering them for sale" (1988: 113).

not anachronisms in a modern society but rather the sine qua non of the latter's success" (1995:11).[3]

Trust is often mentioned in the same breath as values (Misztal, 1996: 33-64): the image of Man as a calculating egoist inspires no confidence. Allegiance to values is by contrast considered a basis for mutual understanding and trust. The crisis of confidence with which most western societies are at present confronted, therefore boosts the attention for values. In various western countries a loss of confidence in politics and government is observed (Klingemann & Fuchs, 1995; Adams & Lennon, 1992; Blendon et. al., 1997). In countries where opinion polls have been measuring that confidence for a considerable time, that loss has become a familiar phenomenon. In the United States for example, the decline began in the sixties. Since then it has continued almost undiminished (Nye, 1997; Nye, Zelikow & King, 1997). Occasionally there is a short-term recovery in confidence, but this then disappears quickly once more. That loss of trust in politics and government does not seem up to now to have led to a rejection of the democratic form of government (Nye, 1997, Lipset & Schneider, 1987). But it can impede effective administration and policy (Lane, 1988:34) and eases the rise of extremist, populist and simplistic politics (Orren, 1997). According to Neustadt (1997:180) it makes political renewal almost impossible and impedes the implementation of policy. Mistrust also has economic consequences, inter alia because it increases the time and resources that have to be spent on control. Employment agreements and contracts become longer, job descriptions grow into volumes, malpractice suits take up a great deal of time and money, and so on. The costs attached to realising economic transactions become high and put a damper on economic creativity. Attention to the negative economic consequences of a lack of trust has recently increased greatly, together with the interest in social and cultural conditions for economic welfare (from the literature which is beginning to seem a tidal wave: Peyrefit, 1995; Fukuyama, 1995; Rosenberg & Birdzell, 1986; Harrison, 1992).

Values have not only been rediscovered in a quest for the origins of the wealth and welfare of nations, but also in the more modest setting of the workshop, the shop and the company. According to Kanter & Mirvis (1989) individual maximisation of profit easily leads to cynicism. In their opinion, cynical people believe that everyone is cynical. They justify their own cynicism on the basis of the assumed cynicism of others. In this way this attitude creates the objective foundations for its existence. Cynicism boosts cynicism, and beyond a certain level this attitude creates problems in the workplace. It is such observations which caused Amitai Etzioni to write: "...to the extent that people use the neo-classical paradigm as a guide for their behaviour, they undermine the possibility of practicable capitalism" (1988:250). The existence of the market economy has, according to Etzioni, a moral foundation. If people really behaved as neo-classical theory says they behave, this foundation would disappear and a free market economy would become impossible.

---

[3] Research, including the results of the World Values Survey, indicates a positive relationship between trust, social participation and effective politics (Putnam, 1995). A position opposed to that of Fukuyama is defended by Beck (1992).

The causes already considered concern a change in thinking about the conditions of effective policy (Putnam, 1993) and good business practice. Reasons for a greater importance of values can also be detected in the mode of production and the organisation of work.

One of the most important tendencies in that connection is the increase in the number of jobs which demand a measure of self-direction. Kohn (1989) has documented this trend extensively and demonstrated how the work experience of the parents influences the values which are transmitted to the children. The shift from what is now called a Fordist organisation, towards more flexible organisational models, characterised by less external control and greater autonomy leads, according to Kohn, to a declining sensitivity to external control and authority and a growing emphasis on commitment and internalised control. This tendency has recently been presented in a more radical way by authors like Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991a, 1991b). In their opinion, patterns of behaviour and the identity which can be derived from class, sex or ideology, are losing their binding force. They no longer give meaning or direction to life. Individuals must, to an increasing extent, derive meaning individually, on the basis of the materials that their often hectic and unpredictable life course provides. Giddens describes this development as modern man becoming reflective. All aspects of life have to be reinterpreted frequently in the light of new information and new concepts provided by the sciences. Reflection and justification become more frequent. The discursive justification of behaviour in the light of values approached reflexively becomes, according to Beck and Giddens, an everyday practice.

The importance symbols and work with symbols has attained in contemporary society and economy, also favours the attention paid to values. The spectacular increase in our technological means and our control over the material conditions of life, make us realise that our welfare and our well-being from now on will be strongly dependent on the attitudes, convictions, knowledge and opinions - in brief on cultural factors - which determine how the technical resources are used. That awareness is very concretely expressed in the sort of work that contemporary men and women do. Less and less people are employed in industrial production, more and more in the so-called services sector where work involves dealing with people and with symbols. Even the centre of gravity of core economic tasks no longer lies so much in the production of goods to satisfy needs, as in the creation of needs, the recognition and boosting of trends, the application of small, distinguishing differences of status, et cetera. The economy is now market rather than production driven (Perret and Roustang, 1993) and therefore symbolic, cultural factors play an important role.

Under the influence of this development attention shifts from given culture to produced culture. It is often assumed that values, opinions, meanings, methods of presentation and so on belong to the most stable dimensions of society (Parsons, 1966). They are then in a certain sense considered as the identity of societies. One of the historically most influential expressions of that opinion is nationalism: the conviction that an important, defining part of individual identity is contained in the cultural identity of a people. The story of nationalism, its durability and rebirths,

witnesses to the importance of that opinion[4]. Even a superficial acquaintance with cultural history teaches us that people are at one time greatly interested in their links with a distant past, and then at another more involved with the creation of culture here and now. In the first case they are in search of the continuity which can be discerned over long periods of time. They are seeking traces that can sometimes only be excavated by philologists from the depths of language and that link us to ancient myths. In the other case attention is devoted to the creation of contemporary culture. Today attention is strongly directed towards the creation of culture her and now. The high degree of literacy of the population, the enormous amount of time devoted to watching television, the constant sound-decor of music, radio and television broadcasts and the ubiquitous presence of advertising, make the contemporary environment especially rich in symbolism. A great many people are professionally involved in the production and distribution of these symbols. It therefore seems natural that attention has shifted from culture as a constant to culture as a product of cultural work, from the values contained in the cultural inheritance, to the creation, distribution and formation of values.

As a consequence of these different developments the schools are now increasingly expected to contribute to value formation and education is regarded as an institution that shapes culture. A fairly clear vision of values emerges from the developments that were sketched above. They are regarded as conditions for social community, economic growth and political effectiveness. They are considered to be important for the formation of trust, social capital and citizenship. The emphasis shifts from values as given, to values as a way in which individuals and groups realise themselves. People are considered as producers of their culture and society, and value formation or values education is recognised as an important element in that process. Values education is no longer regarded as a question of citizens who unthinkingly, from habit, follow values and abide by norms, but of citizens who come to a reasoned, discursive responsible acceptance of those values and norms. In this way the schools are confronted with a very clear, precise, and demanding question: how can they engage in values education in a way that meets the current (high) expectations?

In the second, extensive part of this paper I shall deal with the implications of this rediscovery of values for values education. I shall do so in the light of the insights of sociological value studies and cultural analysis. It is an attempt to identify and describe a number of general objectives and concepts that can guide the development of values education. By general objectives I understand those objectives which should be common to value formation, regardless of the specific convictions (ideologies, communities of discourse) that inspire a specific curriculum. I formulate these objectives without as yet systematising them into a teaching plan or without attempting to state how the different objectives can be achieved at the different levels of education. This paper is certainly not an attempt to discuss all conditions that can influence values education, such as the formation of teacher's, the degree of participation and democracy at school, the relationship between the curriculum and extra-curricular activities, the style of school management. The goals and concepts listed are intended to be of some help in the development of a curriculum, not to offer an exhaustive list

---

[4] Harrington (1998), no longer situates this ideology at the level of the nation, but at that of civilisations anchored in a religious heritage. This proposition, as well as the intense reactions it has provoked, illustrate the renewed interest in culture and civilisation as sources of values.

of the conditions that can contribute to successful values education. The main challenges facing values education today, derive from the emphasis on reflexivity and the ambition to shape culture via values education.

2. Objectives for contemporary value formation

Values education is not easy to introduce into schools. In the Flemish Community[5] an attempt has been made to introduce a specific vision of value formation in education. That was done by introducing teaching targets or definitions of final qualifications or competencies that pupils should have attained. Such targets are formulated for all domains, and for a few areas of values education, such as 'social skills' and education for citizenship. The achievement of the targets in values education is not aimed at via a concrete subject or course, but through a cross-curricular approach. A broad public debate preceded the introduction of these targets in primary and the first grades of secondary education. During that debate a number of criticisms were frequently expressed (CID, 1994):
- citizenship training is unavoidably a form of propaganda;
- value formation is a precursor of totalitarianism;
- general objectives for value formation are inherently conservative; they always confirm the ruling consensus;
- citizenship training and value formation obscure differences and impose a mono-culture on society.

Without denying the possible relevance of these criticisms, one can in my opinion state on the basis of sociological insights that value formation is unavoidable. Research into the "hidden curriculum" has demonstrated that 'value free' education simply does not exist. The way in which teachers teach, the way in which communication between pupil and teacher takes place, the nature of the relations between the staff and the school principal, the architecture of the school, the various school rituals, etc. are all value-forming (Klaassen, 1992; Klaassen, 1996). There is therefore no choice between value formation and the absence of it. The only choice concerns the alternative between conscious or discursive and unconscious or practical value formation. The rediscovery of values is therefore not so much related to the creation of value formation, but to the growing need to make values education a conscious, discursive, self-aware part of education. Values are ceasing to be a latent presence to become manifest. Value formation, as it is discussed today, is therefore not only a process in which latently present values are absorbed, but also a way in which manifest values are taught. As a consequence value formation must assume a fairly high level of reflexivity.

The process of making values explicit will within pluralist modern societies, always lead to the discovery of agreements and disagreements. This does not trivialise the criticisms of a centrally-controlled value formation. Anyone interpreting that criticism in good faith, recognises two familiar tensions in it. The first is related to the scale of

---

the collectivity for which the value formation applies. The second concerns the range or depth of the value consensus assumed.

In principle, the scale of the value formation can vary from the individual school to the state and to international organisations such as the European Union. The value formation will in one case be specific to the educational project of an individual school, in another it will be common to all the schools in the same state or political jurisdiction. Although local communities or other organizing authorities of individual schools, can demand the right to offer a specific educational or pedagogical project and a specific value formation in their schools, most states will put forward a number of common values and justify these in terms of the conditions for full participation in the economic, political, social and cultural life of the society (e.g. Veldhuis, 1997). The emphasis on common values (or standards for value formation) will generally be greater in proportion to the degree to which the education is subsidised by taxation. As soon as an attempt is made to make the value formation self-aware and discursive, and a shift from latent value confirmation to manifest value formation is realised, compromises will have to be made between the two positions. A distinction then has to be made between objectives and criteria which are common to all members of the society on the one hand, and acceptable specifications which are characteristic of certain groups and schools on the other. Different educational systems can then occupy different positions on that continuum.

The second tension is related to the question of how encompassing or deep the consensus should be. The debate in the social sciences and in philosophy between the liberals and the communitarians (or in German sociology between, for example, Luhmann and Habermas), is sufficiently well known (see for example, Mulhall & Swift, 1992). At the one extreme there is the proposition that there must only be consensus about the procedures for debating and settling disputes, resulting in respect for the law, while at the other extreme there is the position that a consensus is required on important values for a culture to be really viable (MacIntyre, 1990). To a large extent this debate is a conflict over the relative importance of procedural and substantive rights.

Value formation will always be confronted with conflicts about scale and depth. These are characteristic of the process by which value formation transforms latent into manifest values. Such conflicts are a consequence of the existence within the same society of different visions of the good life and the good society. Therefore values education should include this tension. The tension and its attending conflicts should be treated as an externality of the values education, but as a subject of values education. The latter should not so much opt for a position in relation to scale and depth, as clarify this particular choice for the pupils. Value formation must as a consequence also be related to the discovery of the necessity, the possibilities, implications and limitations of the procedural (juridical) and the substantive approaches to rights and duties. Value formation must result in the ability to employ values at the level of the school, the family, the local community, the state, international organisations and humanity, but must at the same time clarify the tensions between the value specifications at these different levels. It must for example make clear that a local scale often allows for greater inequalities than a national, and that world solidarity is often vaguer, less concretely demanding than smaller-scale forms of solidarity.

2.1 Values in action

Values are often defined as the desired (Rokeach, 1974). On the basis of such a conception values formation is considered successful when the learners actually desire the desirable. The emphasis that Kluckhohn (1951), inspired by the pragmatic philosopher and educational reformer John Dewey, placed on the difference between the 'desired' and the 'desirable', clearly shows the flaws of that conception of values. According to Kluckhohn values must allow people to distinguish between what they would like to do at a given moment (the desired) and what they think they should do (the desirable). According to Kluckhohn, the relevance of values and the possibility of moral or ethical discourse stands or falls with the existence of that distinction[6]. Reducing values to the desired, reduces value formation to a kind of conditioning, while it should lead to the competence to deal with values.

The idea that values are measures that allow people to make judgements over what is good, right, useful, just, true, in short over what is desirable, and to direct their actions in this manner, was strongly propagated through the work of Talcott Parsons (1951: 12; 1989). In his approach, values appear as general criteria through which goals are chosen and on the basis of which motives, actions and institutions can be discussed and judged. For example when confronted with poverty, different positions can be adopted. People may judge that poverty is the product of irresponsible behaviour and therefore justly deserved, on the other hand it can be stated that poverty should not be judged in terms of deserts, but should be considered an unacceptable injustice. The specific stance that a person takes, can be inspired by a variety of motives. The personal social background, the degree of poverty that has been experienced, either personally or from nearby, will probably play an important role. If a person needs to defend the stance adopted, he or she will however reach for values: for example, appealing to 'solidarity' in the one case or to 'personal responsibility' in the other.

Parsons was convinced that every culture needs to make four fundamental choices in its approach to people, actions, and objects (the so-called four pattern variables). The choices made, define and constitute a particular culture. Modern researchers are less enthusiastic about the possibility of identifying such a limited number of universal value dimensions. The idea that values should be described in terms of distinction and choices has on the contrary become widely accepted (Wuthnow, 1989: 50 et seq. and chapter 3). Distinctions are also central to Pierre Bourdieu's work as the title of his most famous work, La distinction (1979) testifies. People have often interpreted this book as if it were a continuation of Torstein Veblen's work on the desire of people to distinguish themselves from others through consumption and style. When looking back at the reception of his book, Bourdieu stressed (1994: 24) that "La distinction" is not a work on the effects of the desire for distinction. The central theme of the book is that something only exists in so far as it is distinguished from

---

[6] This argument is developed in Kohlberg's work etc. He distinguishes different stages in the moral development of the child. According to Kohlberg in the lower level, moral means that children and young people learn to make the difference between the desired and the desirable. In the lowest stage of moral development, people and actions are widely judged on the basis of the pleasure and the pain that they entail; their meaning and worth is only defined in so far as they detract or add to the wished for. The desirable therefore does not as such exist, but is entirely determined by the desired. A definition like that of Rokeach states that ethics and morals do in fact always coincide with the wished for. Even if one does not agree with the details of the theory of moral development as proposed by Kohlberg, the problems of Rokeach's definition are obvious.

something else and that something can only be distinguished when somebody finds the distinction important and one of the qualities distinguished is considered more valuable than the other. Once such distinctions and valuations exist, people can use them to distinguish themselves through association with valued objects, behaviour, attitudes, knowledge and other people. In this way *La distinction* discusses the striving for distinction, but as it were in the second place, as a possible social consequence of the more fundamental activities of distinguishing and valuing.

In contemporary value research attention has shifted to the empirical study of the way in which people make distinctions and choices in concrete situations and deal with value judgements involved. In this way, for example, one can wonder what "news value" is. How do journalists make the distinction between what is valuable as news and what is not (Shoemaker, et. al., 1991; Berkowitz, 1990; Tumber, 1993; Hjarvard, 1992; Alexander, 1990)? Exploration of the meaning of this distinction and of the valuation and selection of "news worthy" events that are based on it can help pupils to become familiar with the concepts of distinction and valuation. It will also help them to understand the nature of "news". It will clearly show them that bringing the news entails the selection of a very limited number of items from a great number of potentially newsworthy events. If the news is analysed in that way, making news appears as a creative cultural activity, not as an activity that reflects what is happening in the world. That means that an interpretative framework is already incorporated into the news, along with the distinctions and values attached to it. Within the framework of value development an analysis of the news can be used to discover what interpretative framework has been used (Are people presented as representatives of a category or collective or on the other hand as individuals? Is the form of the news determined by what is considered important by experts or what appeals to the wider public?). The news can be used to identify rhetorical figures, for example the figure of direct observation at the scene as opposed to the figure of post hoc analysis.

The example of news value clearly shows that the understanding of values points to a number of different actions: distinguishing, valuing, evaluating, and justifying. The use of values finally depend on distinctions such as good/bad, true/false, useful/not useful, meaningful/meaningless. The qualities distinguished are valued differently. Truth is better than untruth, at least in science. This distinction is less relevant for a novel. Some distinctions make it clear by definition which of the two qualities being distinguished deserve the highest value: good is obviously better than bad. Nevertheless 'distinguishing' and the 'valuing' should be analytically distinguished. Sometimes what is not useful is better, or at least more agreeable than what is useful. There are white lies, when a little untruth is to be preferred to an unnecessarily painful truth. Value formation must make people sensitive to the inevitability of contextually dependent values. The capacity to act faithfully in accordance with values, does not appear from the stubbornness with which the values or principles are put into practice, but with the integrity with which they are adapted to each context without distorting them. In other words, values education must teach the virtues of pragmatism. The competence to deal with values is double. In the first place it is the competence to use the criteria by which one can judge good or bad, truth or falsehood, good taste or poor taste. Secondly, it is the competence to judge in which contexts and situations certain distinctions and valuations are relevant and pertinent, and how they should be applied in that specific situation.

Distinctions are fundamental for the development of values and often have a particularly strong tie to a specific sphere of action or institution, for example truth/falsehood to science, newsworthy/devoid of interest in journalism, useful/not useful to the economy, etc. One of the

qualities distinguished is, under certain circumstances, more valuable than the other. When, in a certain situation, a certain quality (for example, newsworthiness, truth, usefulness, or solidarity) is desirable, then it is still necessary to use specific criteria in order to evaluate the newsworthiness, truth, usefulness, or solidarity. These criteria can be fairly vague, as in the case of newsworthiness, and mainly unwritten, but known practically by experienced journalists. In other situations there can be more explicit rules, as in scientific methodologies. Sometimes the rules are fairly precise and formal, as in the procedures that are developed for legal matters. In most situations however, the criteria do not form a clear set of explicitly formulated rules.

Values education occurs in every subject because they all involve handling criteria in order to make judgements and to defend them. Values education must therefore become a part of each subject. The relevance to values education can be greatly increased by highlighting the crucial distinctions in a discipline and by focussing on the way criteria are used to deal with those distinctions. In addition, values education must make the difference between practical and discursive knowledge: between the handling of practical criteria which are used but can only be put into words with difficulty on the one hand, and the competence to discursively use criteria on the other. In contemporary society, characterised by manifest attention to values, value development will add to the competence to make the practically handled criteria explicit and discursive.

In order to teach the capacity to deal with values, to judge the pertinence of distinctions and to use the criteria to pass judgements, three possibilities exist: one can turn values education into a separate subject, one can see values education as based exclusively on cross-curricular activity, one can, finally, see values education as part of the teaching of any subject. The three approaches are not mutually exclusive. Values education as a separate subject seems appropriate in teachers' training. Some subjects, like courses in morals, civics, cultural sociology or cultural studies, courses in religious or secular ethics, have a strong affinity with values education. They usually deal explicitly with the desirable, with morals, ethics and virtues. Besides those sites for values education, an effort should certainly be made to strengthen the component of values education in all subjects. This can be done by highlighting the crucial distinctions that are made, by identifying the areas of life in which those distinctions are relevant, by making the criteria for judgement explicit and by teaching the competent use of those criteria. This important aspect of values education can as well, or even better be thought in courses of mathematics, economics or accountancy, than in courses of morals, history or civics. Cross curricular activity seems a poor substitute for the discovery of the value relevant aspects of all courses, but it can confront the distinctions, valuations and criteria thought in different subjects, with de conceptions of the desirable and the virtuous as presented in de courses more explicitly dealing with values, ethics and morals. I will go into the way in which that can be achieved when dealing with the issues of justification and value foundation.

2.2 Crisis, justification and tradition

Distinctions are systematically related to each other and together form complex structures. The distinction between private/public for example, acquires depth because 'private' is associated with intimate, personal, sheltered, secret, etc. In this way a cultural structure comes into existence, that also inscribes itself in time and space. Certain spaces such as the home and certain times such as the evening and the weekend are associated with a private sphere. The

boundaries that give the world a meaningful structure, are drawn in that way. Therefore the development of values must also cover the analysis of the spatial and temporal settings. A school as a spatial and temporal organisation can be used as the subject of values education. On can for instance raise the question whether the spatial, architectural form of the school is consistent with the values that the school professes. Is the architectural arrangement and style, for instance, consistent with the 'open', 'democratic' character which the school wants to exude or does the spatial organisation of the school "say" that the school is "lying" when it puts those values forward? One can also explore the question of how a group that wants to live by certain values can accommodate to the unwielding buildings and temporal organisations in which it has to live.

A distinction draws a boundary and creates at the same time the tendency to limit the range of acceptable behaviour and the possibility of boundary crossing. As a boundary is drawn between the public and private spheres, to retain this example, the possibility is created for people to be slightly different in the private sphere from in the public sphere, a limit is put on what is acceptable behaviour in public spaces as opposed to private spaces, but the interest of boundary crossing, for instance under the form of gossip, is created at the same time. Each boundary is both a barrier and a temptation to cross or transgress it. George Bataille defined eroticism as the exceeding of a norm or a boundary which is not questioned. Although that understanding fits best with distinctions and boundaries concerned with the body, any crossing of boundaries is fascinating[7]. Values education must definitely incorporate the experience of exceeding boundaries and use that experience to illustrate the meaning and the point of distinctions and norms. The manner in which young people use their bodies as the bearers of meaning, can be singled out for special attention. The body easily becomes a representation of the body politic.

Crossing a boundary holds the promise of not only transgressing it, but of exceeding and transcending the limits inherent in it. If originality is valued, it can always be simulated by exceeding boundaries. For example, if the important distinctions are of an aesthetic nature, such as in a world of art where important judgements are made by artists and by knowledgeable, specialised critics, the striving for originality will take on a character of breaking or exceeding the well-known aesthetic standards and technical limitations (Peterson, 1994: 169; Bourdieu, 1994: 77-78). If, on the other hand, the artists' success is dependent on public opinion, and not so much on the judgement of colleagues and specialists, the likelihood increases that exceeding the boundaries will no longer be sought through breaking aesthetic conventions but through the transgression of the moral conventions known to the wider public (Dubin, 1992). This mechanism explains why artists who are both dependent on public and specialists' approval, will produce art that tries to break both aesthetic and moral conventions (Hughes, 1993). Robert Mapplethorpe's famous X portfolio is a good example of this. The conflicts concerning good morals which are created around art are not coincidental, and definitely not of secondary importance. From the moment artists are no longer exclusively or mainly dependent on an aesthetically educated public, moral transgression becomes one of the

---

[7] According to Mary Douglas, the possibility exceeding in a large number of so-called primitive cultures that charters receive their power by breaking human laws, engaging in incest relationships, or eating human flesh, must not be explained in a good logical manner. A number of substances and deeds are given a special meaning because they exceed boundaries. The boundary of the body is very important in that connection. Saliva, blood, human milk, urine, sperm, faeces, tears, sweat, have all got a special meaning because they exceed boundaries.

easiest ways in which art can shift boundaries, be original and create interest. Values education should make clear which boundaries and boundary crossings are relevant and pertinent in certain contexts and under which circumstances boundary crossing becomes a misplaced form of originality.

The distinctions, valuations and criteria which give our world cultural and moral structure often remain latent, unspoken. They are then present as unquestioned and self-evident. In general evaluations, values and distinctions are only thought about and spoken of when we have to justify our behaviour or ask for a justification from others. Justification is the mechanism that encourages us to explore our cultural and moral structures. The distinction that Kluckhohn makes between the desired and the desirable accords with the distinction that is made between 'values' and 'preferences'. MacIntyre (1990: 12-21) distinguishes expressions such as 'I find that attractive' from expressions like 'that is attractive'. While the first indicates a personal preference the second expresses a value. Even if, in contrast to MacIntyre, one does not consider the belief in the existence of one valid value system as a condition for the good society, there is still a great difference between preferences and values. A preference records a personal predisposition. An expression like 'I find that attractive' is a straight forward way of expressing that. On the contrary a value judgement is offered as the implication of the criteria and the standards which it is assumed a group agrees about. The person who says 'that is attractive' actually says 'in the light of the criterion that I assume we use to judge attractiveness, this is attractive'. There can be discussion and debate about such an expression. Is the distinction attractive/not attractive relevant here? Do we agree about the criteria by which the attractiveness is measured? Are those criteria valid in the given circumstances? Does our judgement proceed logically from those criteria? In contrast there is little to be said about personal preferences. *De gustibus non est disputandem*. That is the difference between preferences and values. It lies not in the nature of the preferences or the values that are expressed, but in the meaning that is given to the expression. The existence of values depends on the readiness and the possibility of talking and judging about preferences. That happens when personal preferences have to be justified, but it is only possible to the extend that people do share distinctions, values and criteria. Dialogue, discussion and debate are therefore both necessary conditions and consequences of values. For this reason they must occupy an important place in the formation of values. Values education must at the same time reveal the conditions of rational discussion and make clear that justification and discussion are not a post-hoc rationalisation or a strategic search for self-justification, but forms of deliberation which transform shared meanings and values into new insights and values.

Such a conception of discussion is not naive. It is not blind to the existence of people for whom discussions are merely strategic, but draws attention to the inherent dynamic of discussions. If the discussion is serious or heated, reference will often be made to the hypocrisy of the opposing party. As anyone familiar with polemics knows, opponents have a tendency to be hypocritical. With opponents there is often a wide gap between word and deed. Their reasoning is full of gaps and contradictions. Mostly it isn't difficult to demonstrate that certain values and principles to which they appeal are actually opposed to the other values they claim to defend. Opponents do not always see the implications of their values clearly. They are not always aware of what they say or support. In all those arguments, which are frequently used against opponents, we can see strategic moves with which one party wants to convince the other. Generally that motive is clearly present. Were it not, many discussions would be dull. It is however important to realise that the inherent dynamic of discussions rises above that strategic motivation. By conducting discussions in the way we usually do that, we

indicate, among other things, the importance of integrity in terms of the values that we appeal to, the importance of consistency between the different values that we appeal to and the difference between higher values and subordinate values. In such discussion we also clarify the criteria with which judgements can be reached, discuss the applicability of those criteria, and explore the unintended consequences of values. In short, in that way we construct the more or less coherent totality of opinions, values, knowledge and criteria, which allow us to live in a responsible way. Of course, not all discussions are fruitful. The common ground may be so limited that the discussion degenerates into a senseless slanging-match or worse. Discussion only becomes a meaningful part of values education if it makes clear that fruitful discussion is only possible on the basis of a number of shared distinctions, values and criteria. In many discussions the time for the exchange of arguments is so limited that the discussion becomes unfruitful and degenerates into a simple rhetorical exchange of one-liners and sound-bites. It is therefore not a bad idea to impose the slowness of the written word on important discussions. It is sufficient that both parties have a little time and feel somewhat obliged by the requirement to be consistent in their argumentation for justification to lead to value clarification.

Discussion and justification are moments of creative crisis when values become manifest. Such crises often have a collective character. It frequently happens that groups must suddenly make their practical routinely experienced culture into an object of reflection. The occasion for this may be their migration to a new social environment or the presence of immigrants from another culture (when the problems of multi-culturalism call a familiar culture into question). In such cases people must suddenly make clear to others (and often to themselves) what exactly is characteristic of their culture and their way of life. This often leads to fundamentalist interpretations of the cultural heritage. Such activity can of course not be regarded as a simple registration of what exists. It is generally a truly creative process in which a collective identity is as much formed as expressed. During such moments of intense cultural creativity, 'traditions' are often invented. The observation that some traditions are of recent origin (see for example Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), shocks certain people, while precisely the capacity to create traditions should be regarded with awe and admiration. Hobsbawm indicates that some periods are especially creative in that regard, such as the European countries in the period between 1870 and 1914 (1983a and 1983b). That was the period in which many contemporary national cultures and sub-cultures were formed and/or revitalised. That creativity was stimulated by the process of industrialisation and the rapid social changes associated with it. Various movements, that reacted against the consequences of industrialisation, appeared then. They often dealt with the existing cultural structures and heritages in an exceptionally creative way, revitalizing languages, creating written languages, inventing traditions, spreading feelings of national identity, etc (Jackson Lears, 1981, Wiener, 1985, originally 1981).

The images of past and present constructed by such cultural movements show reality in a certain way. They provide as it were the screen on which people observe and interpret life and the world. They can make their influence felt via painting, literature, popular entertainment, tourism, ideology, politics and science. We always get to know our reality by means of the way in which it is presented. The sociology of culture and cultural studies should therefore be considered as an important part of values education. The latter would be very incomplete without attention for the way in which the production of culture in the form of science, architecture, landscape creation, painting, literature and other forms, influences our ways of seeing, thinking and feeling. Values education can therefor not be divorced from an in depth

exploration of cultural structures and codes. The disciplines able to do that should certainly become part of the teachers' training.

2.3 The foundation of values

The justification of behaviour in terms of values and criteria, and the exploration of cultural forms, are important for values education, but are not sufficient. Certainly in reflexive modernity, values education must be supplemented with the justification of values. The foundation and justification of values clarifies the link between a personal motivation and a collective value or, in other words, makes personal behaviour and personal motivations publicly justifiable.

Parsons' four-function paradigm specifies a number of fundamental values. According to that theory action can be oriented by four fundamental values.
1. The value test for action may be *integrity*, as this is expressed in an agreement between action and the principles people appeal to justify their actions.
2. The value test may be *community*, as this is expressed in a consensus on the desirability of the action.
3. The value test for the action can be *effectiveness* as this is measured on the basis of an agreement between the results of the action and the intended objectives.
4. The value test can finally be *utility* as that is measured on the basis of an efficient use of the available resources.

Those value principles and their criteria were developed in the first place to describe the specialisation of systems of action. Thus it can be said that in a free-market economy, economic organisations give priority to the value utility and have developed a specific concept of utility as saleable on a free market, as well as specific concepts and media to judge utility, such as 'money', 'profit' and 'solvency'. Religious organisations, on the other hand, are more likely to give priority to the value 'integrity'. They can, in the case of the religions of the Book, use a measure of conformity with scripture to evaluate integrity. In this way Parsons' framework can be used to describe how various differentiated systems or spheres of action also form specialised spheres of value which, because they give priority to a specific value, imply different conceptions of justice (cf. Walzer 1983) and of justification. That fundamental and useful distinction does however not yet indicate how the different value options are collectively justified and how they can become part of the lifeworld. Parsons' framework does describe a number of value options, but does not explain the mechanism by which these justify themselves and develop into grounds for values that can be used in everyday life. By stating that the contemporary (capitalist) economy uses and makes operational a particular definition of utility does as such not offer a justification for that definition. Such a justification can be called the foundation of values. To clarify that notion I shall further explore the example of utility. To that end I use the very interesting analysis Jean-Christophe Agnew made of the relationship between the extension of market transactions and the development of the theatre in England between 1550 and 1750 (1986).

When in the late Middle-Ages and the Early Modern period market transactions - buying and selling goods and services on the market - became more frequent, that led to a great deal of concern. Previously transactions between people were generally embedded in stable, well known relationships characterised by familiar mutual expectations, rights and duties. They

took place between the members of a household, between master and servant, between lord and subject. They were a predictable event within an existing familiar relationship and order. Market transactions did not comply with that pattern. They offered new freedoms to the individual but therefore also contained new risks, uncertainties and threats. The new market transactions were unfamiliar, they could not be situated and the motives driving them therefore seemed divorced from values. People could not justify them. The extension of the market led to the feeling that society was disintegrating. People believed that the familiar relationships were dissolving and that the social institutions were failing, exposing atomised and unprotected individuals to the risks of a society in which everyone acted out of an untempered appetite for personal gain. These feelings were reflected even in the opinion about the medium for market exchange, money. This was considered as a rootless medium. It was separated from its origin and had no destination. It is popularly said that money has no smell. In John Webster's 'A Cure for a Cuckold' (circa 1625) this is rendered as follows:

…ready money is the prize I look for
It walks without suspicion any where,
When Chains and Jewels may be stayed and call'd
Before the Constable (op.cit. Agnew, 1986:71)

Such concerns were an important topic of 16th and 17th century theatre. Calming the unrest that proceeded from the spread of market transactions intensely occupied various sorts of intellectuals during the course of the 17th and 18th centuries. It was not the men of letters but the philosophers and social scientists who devised the most influential solution. Yes indeed, they said, everyone acts out of self interest, even out of selfish concerns, and the clever ones do it rationally, but we don't need to be worried about it. It is quite all right, even more, it has truly positive consequences. In the writings of these social scientists a capricious woman regularly appears who is always wanting a new dress when the old one is not yet worn out. Using an anachronism one could say that she is a sort of Emma Bovary, capricious, changeable and a slave to fashion. In the 19th century novel by Gustave Flaubert the romantic Emma sows ruin, death and destruction with these character traits. But that is not what her predecessor does in Adam Smith's 18th century tracts. There on the contrary with her caprice she puts weavers, cutters, needlewomen and seamstresses to work, makes the textile sector run and in this way contributes to the 'wealth of nations'. After he had considered the nature of motives in 'The Theory of Moral Sentiments' of 1759, in 'The Wealth of Nations' of 1776 Smith primarily tried to make clear how acting out of self interest contributes to collective welfare. That proposition at the same time justifies the market transaction and its assumed motive, and allays the fear of the consequences of the free play of that motive. The possibility that people in transactions and consumption promote their own interest and can in that way indulge their passions and emotions is justified in that way as a method of serving personal passions and collective well-being at the same time. According to Smith's famous remark, our meals are not the result of the charity of the butcher, the brewer and the baker but of the self-interest of these people.

In that way Smith reconciles a certain image of man and a well-defined motive for individual behaviour - acting out of self-interest - with the demand that the individual behaviour should also contribute to the collective interest and should be justifiable in this way. It is those kinds of arguments I call value foundations. They underpin the value of a certain sort of behaviour and a certain sort of behavioural motive.

Naturally different sorts of value foundations exist. Luc Boltanski and Laurant Thévenot made an attempt a few years ago to chart a number of them (1991). They do not make it clear on what basis they identified them or on what kind of social theory they are based.[5] That does however not detract from the relevance of their conclusions. Although they formalise the market model just described in rather weak way (Boltanski and Thévenot speak in this connection of the "cité, marchande"), it is clear that they use it as the matrix for the five other value foundations they describe. I freely translate the foundations they distinguish and present them as competencies. Value foundations have the following characteristics:

- (1) A value foundation offers justification for a certain sort of behavioural motive and the ensuing behaviour and practices.
- (2) Such a foundation is linked to the practical knowledge and values which makes it possible to act with competence on the basis of justified motives.
- (3) Such a foundation also refers to an exemplary institutional context in which the motives justified and the competencies that are valued are present in an outstanding, exemplary way.
- (4) It is also associated with secondary virtues, that support the main competencies.
- (5) A foundation is expressed symbolically in a style (for instance a dress code) and in various cultural products.

In the market model the behaviour motive is rational action from self-interest. The foundation of the value is the principle of the invisible hand and the innumerable neo-classical variations on it, which demonstrate that such action, under free-market conditions, is the most optimal way to contribute to general welfare. The practical knowledge is what makes it possible for the individual to act rationally from well understood self-interest. These criteria can be developed very inclusively, going from considerations of what knowledge is useful and what courses of study are useful to personality characteristics, skills and attitudes which are considered valuable in the light of the fundamental value, for example flexibility and competitiveness. The latter form in a certain sense secondary values deduced from the fundamental value. The institutional context referred to in the first place is naturally the market, but it will typically be supplemented with institutions that at a certain moment appear to be very closely linked to the operation of the market and represent the fundamental and secondary values in an exemplary way, such as the enterprise. Being enterprising is the way in which individuals, consistent with the fundamental value of this foundation, engage to the full in the process of self-interest and link individual passion with market success and collective wealth and welfare.

Value foundations are easily generalised beyond their original domain and not infrequently beyond reason. They are then presented as generally valid and not as relevant to a certain sphere of action. People who are emotionally strongly involved with a certain foundation, via interests or familiarity, have the tendency to generalise this and present it as a general ground for justification. In the case of the market model this can take the form of a movement such as *enterprise culture* in which the enterprise is presented as the universally desirable model of organisation (Morris, 1991). According to the supporters of the 'enterprise culture' that model should be applied to schools, universities, government administration, etc. School principals must become managers, parents become clients, children become input, knowledge and skills output, the reputation of the school is henceforth image, its power of attraction a question of marketing, its specialisation is market segmentation etc. The market and the way in which companies have adapted to it becomes in that way the general model for organisation. Politically too everything must be set up as far as possible on the market model, which means,

---

[5] Their work is certainly lacking the the critical systematic standards that are characteristic of common theory.

among other things, that the starting point is the individual preference of the voter and that politics must be reduced to a sort of market in which these preferences are registered via referenda or tele-voting. In that model the politician becomes a kind of political entrepreneur, gaining votes and putting together winning coalitions. Rational action from self-interest is presented in this generalisation as a universal model of behaviour. The criteria which are deduced from this are general criteria in the sense that no other value exists outside the market value. The market approach as it is then presented, is for example also the best basis for an art and culture policy and in this approach there is no place for other value judgements than those expressed by the market (De Grauwe, 1990:73). When this model is successfully generalised, 'enterprise' is the most obvious way to self-realisation, in which usefulness to the community, personal financial success and the meaningful experience of a passion are combined. If only to arm young people against the imperialism of different value foundations, it is important that values education makes them familiar with different sorts of foundation and at the same time teaches then to distinguish the context or sphere in which each of them can is relevant.

In addition to the market model Boltanski and Thévenot distinguish five other kinds of value foundations. The second foundation is that of *inspiration*. The origin of this lies in the belief in divine inspiration which can be valid as an ultimate justification of the motive for behaviour and action of the chosen individual. That model has been secularised in the sense that 'inspiration', 'genius' and 'enlightenment' are valid as a ground for value separate from an explicit reference to God. Typical for this value foundation is that something can presented as valuable, even though it goes again the grain of established opinions or common sense and judgements. It is the foundation or justification which is connected with detachment and self-realisation apart from others. Valued competencies are therefore the ability to distinguish oneself from others, to take distance from the prevailing opinion, to resist the pressures of conditions. In this value foundation it is heroic to depart from well-trodden paths, to look at things in a surprising, entirely new way... Everything that contributes to the impression that one is breaking with what exists, is eligible as proof of inspiration: the shocking, the bizarre, the worrying, the spontaneous, the emotional, the fantastic... An exemplary institution is art, but of special value are all margins from which the unexpected can emerge: the Bohemian, the oppressed, childhood, all sorts of marginalised people, drug users, etc.

The third foundation is *opinion*. The value of something is in this case ultimately dependent on the opinion of others. The nature of this foundation is actually most clearly expressed in the conviction that something becomes better to the extent that a great number of people find it good. Important practices associated with this ground are therefore influencing, convincing, sensitising, advertising, public relations, etc. Relevant criteria are public approval, recognition, fame, success. In the light of the grounds for this value it is very unpleasant to be forgotten or misunderstood. An important motive for behaviour is striving for recognition and approval. Important figures and heroes are famous people and 'personalities'. Important institutions and at the same time important mechanisms for co-ordination are being public, making known, the media and naturally public opinion. From the latter value can be read, just as from fashions, attitudes and response. Confidentiality, consciously misleading public opinion, using incomprehensible jargon, pursuing art or science which are only accessible to a small group, despising the masses believing that one knows better than others, are all important offences in the light of this value foundation.

The fourth ground is the *domestic* ('la cité domestique, in Boltanski and Thévenot's terminology). The value is in this model ultimately based on the position which is occupied

within a totality of personal relations. The value of a person or an action cannot be detached from these relationships and the extent to which one is involved in them. The collective ground for value lies in maintaining relationships that are important for society as a whole, in integration and cohesion. Distinct gains are therefore winning and keeping trust, maintaining relationships and being respected. In its simplest, most general form, this is expressed in the proposition that the family is an important foundation for society and that the dissolution of a supportive family life has a strongly negative effect on the quality of society. The relevant virtues and skills are those that make enjoyable and durable personal relationships possible: consideration, courtesy, discretion, reserve, reliability, etc. In this value foundation practical knowledge is valued more than discursive knowledge. The knowledge must be able to be experienced in a spontaneous, unforced, natural way. The model inspires a positive valuation for people who are linked to others. It certainly does not lead, in contrast to the inspiration model, to praising the unattached and the marginal. Integration and cohesion are valuable. Exemplary people are those who are clearly situated. Notions and values such as duty, helpfulness, harmony, care, but also honour, shame, responsibility and authority, are important. Crucial practices are bringing up, educating, continuing, giving and receiving. An important institutional context is naturally family life and the wider family, but in addition, everything that links generations, that is linked to tradition and a concrete local environment, in short, everything that situates people in time and space. This ground for value is generalised in various ways, including notions of community, locality and tradition. Many institutions and organisations say of themselves that they are 'like a family'. An important form of generalisation was the paternalism that, at least in its classical 19th century form, was partly a reaction against the loss of a world which was still strongly influenced by domestic values and relationships. To paraphrase Sennet (1980:51) it can be said that 19th century factory paternalism was not only an attempt to apply domestic values to a new form of organisation, but also a pastiche of that order.

Fundação Cuidar o Futuro

The fifth, the *civic* ground for value is based on a definition of general interest. The general interest is therefore not an aggregation of individual preferences, but a definition of a collective interest to which all individuals subject themselves. That definition is given in terms of defined duties and rights of citizens, which means that the law has to stand above self-interest and individual passion. Important for this value foundation is the belief that a mechanism like voting or democratic participation is more than simple counting preferences and determining a majority. It is expected of democratic politics that they leads to a definition of general or collective interest. It is that interest that the elected representatives should serve. An important value is respect for the law. Important practices are voting, participating, debating, committing one self. Solidarity and militancy are important values. Important institutions are not only the state, but also organisations, parties, associations and movements that make citizenship possible, in short the civil society. The ground for this value puts individual interest, particularistic and corporate pressure groups and individual atomisation in a poor light.

What Boltanski and Thévenot call the 'industrial' value foundation (technocratic seems a better term), is based on the existence of an objectively knowable reality which allows people to choose a course of action. Inspiration, opinion and individual preference are regarded as superficial data in the light of this value foundation. Behind and under all of that there lies a harder, more real foundation which is knowable and to the knowledge of which supreme value should be attached. It is the knowledge of the order controlling reality that makes it possible to realise collective well-being. One must, if required, dare to oppose spontaneous individual inspiration, individual preference and public opinion on the basis of that knowledge. It provides

a more reliable basis for achieving individual and collective well-being and happiness. The motives for behaviour that are justified in this way are those of anyone who intends to act on the basis of knowledge and expertise. The heroes of this order are the experts, the specialists and the scientists. Important criteria are empirical and instrumental accuracy of the knowledge: does it work, is it efficient, is it effective, is it functional, is it reliable, does it solve the problem at hand. Negative things are the useless, inactive, approximate, slow, ineffective and above all the superficial.

These different value foundations cannot be reduced to one another. There is for example a lot of material for conflict between *inspiration* and *opinion*. Those who act on the basis of the first will see a bad omen in popular success. Those who act on the basis of the second will in contrast see confirmation of their value in success. Each ground is also riveted to a specific institutional sphere. The market to the world of enterprise, inspiration to the world of art, opinion to the world of the mass media, the civic order to the world of collective organisations (government, party, movements, associations), the domestic order to the world of the bonds of family, friendship, and "les rélations"; the technocratic order to the world of science and technology. The destiny of each foundation and each institutional are therefore linked to a certain extent. If a certain ground comes to the fore, the institutional sphere to which it is linked will also gain prominence. It is in that sense that Richard Rorty's remark that 20th century philosophy has used the artist who creates rather than the scientist who discovers as a model must be understood (1989:24-25). This does not say much about the relative social importance of art or science, but it does say something about philosophy which, at least according to Rorty, has moved the foundation for its justification in the course of the 20th century from the 'technocratic' model to that of 'inspiration', shifting philosophy's allegiance to different competencies, virtues, and styles.

Boltanski and Thévenot treat the six value foundations not only as mutually different but as equidistant from each other. In my opinion they can be divided into two groups: the 'market', 'inspiration' and 'opinion' on the one hand and the 'domestic', 'civic' and 'technocratic' orders on the other. The first cluster of foundations are strongly individualistic. Value is ultimately embedded in an individual action or in the characteristic of the individual. This is obvious in the case of preference and inspiration which are seen as strictly individual, but it also holds for the opinion, for even though this is rendered more important as more people share it, it is still regarded as a personal opinion. Collective justification comes about because the individual characteristics are aggregated. This process of aggregation is spontaneous. It occurs, without preconceived plan via the market and the *invisible hand*. Personal opinions aggregate into public opinion. Personal inspiration is important because it is in this way that genius and enlightenment can manifest itself, even if one does not immediately have criteria to judge that and one has to wait (until after the proverbial death of the artist) for everyone to acknowledge the genius of the inspiration, that went, at first, unrecognized. In contrast the other three grounds do not have the individual as their point of departure, but an order that transcends the individual. The value lies in that order and becomes part of the action when it is adopted by the individual. Points of departure are the existing social relations and the fabric of expectations they constitute. In the case of the civic order the basis lies in rights and duties, as well as

[1] These value foundations ('inspiration') requires no material art'sts. Its full value one can only judge the value of inspiration, certainly not if it is original and therefore has to wait until a connoisseur can form works of determining its artistic originality. That process is illustrated in an exemplary way by an artist who is dead and was underestimated during his lifetime. It is, therefore, also the case that life of many great artists will be depicted with the lack of recognition disproportionately magnified.' expressed '... opinion manifested' e.g. Van (139).

various forms of participation in organisations that are also communities of discourse carrying ideals and projects. In the case of the technocratic order the basis is knowable reality that stands outside of the individuals' subjectivity. The individuals appear in this approach as embedded in and constituted by, respectively, social relationships, rights, duties, and social participation, and the disciplines which make known the physical, biological, psychological and sociological reality.

Values education must naturally pay attention to all the value foundations, but it relates in a fundamentally different way to the two distinct clusters. The individualistic foundations do, strictly speaking, not require value formation because they are based on the assumption of a spontaneous, automatic aggregation of individual motives into valuable collective consequences. In contrast the collective foundations require values education. The latter will in fact always have to resort to one or more of the collective foundations to justify itself. For that reason there exists a privileged association between collectivist value foundations and values education.

Bibliography

Adams, M. and M. J. Lennon (1992). "Canadians, Too, Fault their political Institutions and Leaders." In: The Public Perspective: 3-19.

Agnew, J. C. (1986). Worlds Apart. The Market and the Theatre in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-1750. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Alexander, J. C. (1982). Theoretical Logic in Sociology. Vol.1, Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Cointroversies. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Alexander, J. C. (1990). The Mass Media in Systemic, Historical, and Comparative Perspective. In: J. C. Alexander, Colomy P. Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives. New York, Columbia University Press: 323-366.

Beck, U. (1992). Risk society: Towards a new modernity. London, Sage.

Berkowitz, D. (1990). "Refining the Gatekeeping Metaphor for Local Television News." In: Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media. 34(1): 55-68.

Birdzell and Rosenberg (1986). X.

Blendon, R. J. and e. al. (1997). Changing Attitudes in America. In: J. S. Nye, P. D. Zelikow and D. C. King. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press: 205-216.

Boltanski, L. and L. Thévenot (1991). De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur. Parijs, Gallimard.

Boudon, R. (1981). De logica van het sociale. Een inleiding tot sociologisch denken. Brussel, Samson.

Bourdieu, P. (1979). La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement. Parijs, Minuit.

Bourdieu, P. (1994). De regels van de kunst: wording en structuur van het literaire veld. Amsterdam, Van Gennep.

CID (1994). De eindtermen secundair onderwijs - eerste graad. Maatschappelijk debat: syntheserapport. Ministerie van de Vlaamse Gemeenschap. Departement Onderwijs, Infocel Eindtermen.

Coleman, J. (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

De Grauwe, P. (1990). De nachtwacht in het donker. Over kunst en economie. Tielt, Lannoo

Douglas, M. (1973). Natural Symbols. Explorations in Cosmology. New York, Vintage Books.

Douglas, M. (1984). Purity and Danger. An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo. London, Routledge and Kegan.

Dubin, S. C. (1992). Arresting Images: Impolitic Art and Uncivil Actions. New York, Routledge.

Elster, J. (1986). Introduction. In: J. Elster. Rational Choice. Oxford, Basil Blackwell: 1-33.

Etzioni, A. (1988). The Moral Dimension. Towards a New Economics. New York, The Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The End of History and the Last Man. New York, Free Press.

Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York, The Free Press.

Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Harris, M. (1985). Good to Eat: Riddles of Food and Culture. New York, Simon & Schushter.

Harrison (1992). X.

Hjarvard, S. (1992). "Live: On Time and Space in Television News." In: Nordicom(2): 111-126.

Hobsbawm, E. and T. Ranger (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Hughes (1993). X.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York, Simon & Schuster.

Jackson Lears, T. J. (1981). No Place of Grace. Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture. 1880-1920. New York, Pantheon Books

Kanter, D. L. and P. H. Mirvis (1989). The Cynical Americans: Living and Working in an Age of Discontent and Disillusion. San Francisco, Jossy-Bass

Klaassen, C. (1992). "The latent Initiation. Sources of unintentional political socialization in the schools." In: Politics and the individual 2(2): 41-65

Klaassen, C. (1996). Socialisatie en Moraal. Onderwijs en waarden in een laat-moderne tijd. Leuven/Apeldoorn, Garant.

Klingemann, H. D. and D. Fuchs (1995). Citizens and the State. Oxford, Oxford University Press

Kluckhohn, C. (1951). Values and Value Orientaions in the Theory of Action. Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press.

Kohlberg, L. (1981). The Philosophy of Moral Development. San Francisco, Harper and Row.

Kohn, M. L. (1989). Cross-national Research as an Analytic Strategy. In: M.L.Kohn. Cross-national Research in Sociology. London, Sage.

Lane, L. M. (1988). "Individualism, Civic Virtue and Public Administration." In: Administration and Society 10: 30-45.

Lipset, S. M. and W. Schneider (1987). The Confidence Gap: Business. Labor and Govenment in the Public Mind. Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press.

MacIntyre, A. (1990). After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory. London, Duckworth.

McGuigan, J. (1991). Cultural Populism. London, Routledge.

Misztal, B. A. (1996). Trust in Modern Societies. Cambridge, Polity Press.

Morris (1991). X.

Neustadt, R. E. (1997). The Politics of Mistrust. In: J. S. Nye, P. D. Zelikow and D. C. King. Why People Don't Trust Govenment. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press: 179-201.

Nye, J. S. J., Zelikow, P.D., King D.C. (1997). Why people don't trust government. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Nye, J. S. (1997). Introduction: The Decline of Confidence in Government. In: J. S. Nye, P. D. Zelikow and D. C. King. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press: 1-18.

Orren, G. (1997). Fall from Grace: The Public's Loss of Faith in Government. In: J. S. Nye, P. D. Zelikow and D. C. King. Why People Don't Trust Government. Cambridge, Mass., Cambridge University Press: 77-107.

Parsons, T. (1951). The Social System. Glecoe, The Free Press.

Parsons, T. (1966). Societies: Evolutionary and comparative perspective. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall.

Perret, B. G. R. (1993). L'Economie contre la société. Affronter la crise de l'integration sociale et culturelle. Paris, Seuil.

Peterson, R. A. (1994). Culture Studies Through the Production Perspective: Progress and Prospects. In: D Crane. The Sociology of Culture. Oxford, Blackwell: 163-190.

Peyrefitte, A. (1995). La societé de confiance: essai sur les origines et la nature du developpement. Paris, Jacob.

Putnam, R. D. (1993). Making democracy work: civic tradition in modern Italy. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Putnam, R. D. (1995). "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital." In: Journal of Democracy 6(1).

Rokeach, M. (1974). The Nature of Human Values. New York, Free Press.

Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony and solidarity. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Sennett, R. (1980). Authority. New York, Knopf.

Shoemaker, P. J., L.H. Damielian & N.Brendlinger (1991). "Deviant Acts, Risky Business and U.S. Interests: The Newsworthiness of World Events." In: Journalism Quarterly 68(4): 781-795.

Smith, H. (1988). X.

Swidler, A. (1986). "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies." In: American Sociological Review, 1986, 51, April: 273-286. 51(April).

Swift, M. (1992). X.

Tumber, H. (1993). "Selling Scandal: Business and the Media,." In: Media, Culture and Society 15(3): 345-361.

Veldhuis, R. (1997). Education for democratic citizenship: dimensions of citizenship, core competences, variables and international activities. Strasbourg, paper prepared for the Council for Cultural Cooperation, Council of Europe.

Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of justice: a defence of pluralism and equality. Oxford, Blackwell.

Wiener, M. J. (1985). English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980. Penguin Books.

Wuthnow, R. (1989). Communities of discourse: ideology & social structure in the reformation, the enlightenment, and European socialism. London, Harvard University Press.