

This report marks the Center's twentieth birthday—a time for reflection on the past and future. Where has the Center come since 1958? Where is it heading now? God willing, the *next* twenty years will take us to the threshold of the twenty-first century.

In the fifties, there was little doubt in anyone's mind what needed to be done at a research center such as this. The world was nuclear, bipolar, and starkly divided. The Soviet Union, seen as drill master of a generally submissive though occasionally rebellious camp, was thought to be expansive and possibly aggressive. The United States and its allies did not intend to yield. The situation was dangerous and unstable. The power, range, and speed of modern weapons, as well as their deployment patterns, heightened the danger and the instability. There were potential flashpoints in Berlin and elsewhere in the old world, and also in the slums and stagnant economies of Third World countries. Many of the latter were struggling to feed exploding populations as they emerged from colonialism and began to manage their own affairs.

From such preoccupations as these, the Center launched research seminars on three broad concerns: bipolar strategic relations in the nuclear era; conditions and developments in the two camps; and economic development to promote stability and security in poor countries. Although different labels were used, something like this trinity of interwoven themes

formed the organizing frame for most of the work conducted at the Center in the early years.

A core of four faculty members directed the research. Robert Bowie and Henry Kissinger from the Government Department, Edward Mason and Thomas Schelling from Economics. Research associates joined the Center for limited periods, typically for a year. They were academic people of varied rank and experience, ranging from senior professors to new "post-docs."

Finally, there were twelve or so experienced "practitioners" from different countries—diplomats, civil servants and military officers spending a year in advanced study and research at Harvard. They were called Fellows. They offered their practical experience as a resource to others, did research of their own, and used the facilities of the University for their professional and personal growth.

Three standing seminars were established, one for each research area. As a general rule, almost everyone at the Center took part in all of them. The style was informal, the emphasis on individual work. There were many angles of approach, and different foci and methods of investigation. But the Center was new, small, and compact. Its tasks and cast of characters, though varied, were closely linked. The interwoven themes held them together and highlighted common concerns. However the world might be divided for analysis, it remained decidedly *one*.



Center typewriters seemed to clatter day and night. From them poured a small torrent of research papers, articles, and books. Some were seminal works. A few offered fundamentally new ways of looking at international problems, and changed the way people think. In one area, Center researchers played a role in opening up a wholly new field called arms control. It remains vital to this day, in national policy-making as well as in research, and the planet is the safer for it.

With changing conditions and new insights, the Center has modified its program, but not its purpose or style. The basic commitment was, and is, to investigate underlying processes of change in international affairs.

In the early sixties, interest in the building of a Western European Community led to the study of functional groupings and incipient supranational institutions in other regions. Comparative analysis of experiments in Europe, East Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean led in turn to investigations of many new processes and actors operating across national boundaries. "Transnational" studies, as they came to be called, highlighted phenomena as diverse as the Scandinavian and Nordic systems, Canada-U.S. relations, international information media, and, above all, in recent years, multinational corporations.

Development studies evolved in comparable fashion. Concentration on the economic aspects yielded only partial understanding of the

development problem. Psychological and social factors frequently seemed to impede growth. Specialists joined the Center to investigate these matters. Somewhat later, development goals themselves came under question. Growth, social "health," democracy, and stability often seemed in conflict. In many places, development misfired, producing squalor, social upheaval, and repression. Economists broadened their sights to analyze the trade-offs between growth and equity. Political scientists focused on political development, participation, and stability.

Similar boundary adjustments in the Center's political and military studies took account of strains, fissures, and cross-cutting patterns that appeared in the communist and western camps. Others responded to new weapons technologies calling for qualitative arms control. Still others reflected the growing strength and changing roles of the middle powers. Preoccupation with the North Atlantic area gave way to concern for a larger balance that encompassed Japan as well.

In a particularly interesting development, the Center started two programs of a type not foreseen at the outset: the Development Advisory Service (DAS) and the Program for Science and International Affairs (PSIA). Each was established on a quasi-autonomous basis with the expectation that after a trial period at the Center they might become fully autonomous. In both cases, that has in fact been the outcome.

The DAS, formed in the Center in 1962, responded to the requests of governments of poor countries for advice in development planning. DAS staff rotated between assignments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America and periods of academic work at Harvard. The flow of data, experience, and ideas from the field enriched research and teaching in the University. The reverse flow often strengthened development planning and practice in the field. In 1973, after eleven years under the Center's wing, the DAS became the Harvard Institute for International Development (HIID), with ties to a number of the University's Faculties whose research contributes to an understanding of modernizing processes.

The PSIA was created more recently, in 1973. Under its auspices, scholars in the physical and social sciences joined forces to carry on the Center's work on strategy and arms control, with particular regard for the implications of new weapons technologies. At a more modest level, they have begun to look at other problems where science and international affairs intersect, for example, the strengthening of national capabilities in science, and the development of technologies appropriate to Third World conditions. The potential agenda is a large one: environmental issues, outer space, the exploitation and governance of the seabed, and so on. On July 1, 1978, after five years with the Center, the PSIA took its place as a Center in its own right in the Kennedy



School of Government.

The fostering of new activities which ultimately might stand on their own feet has proved to be one of the Center's most novel and useful contributions. Another instance of it occurred in the late sixties, when a portion of the initial research program was "spun off," to be carried on in a new Center for European Studies. Such shifts offset growth in other areas, and help to keep the Center for International Affairs small, flexible, and innovative. At the same time, the Center maintains close relations with its offspring and, with them, sponsors a number of joint programs.

By the mid-70s, changing conditions and perceptions had substantially eroded the assumptions that formed the Center's program in the early years. In their limited adversary relationship, the superpowers were managing their affairs with greater circumspection in the competitive areas, while enlarging the areas of cooperation. Less prone to confrontation, they were edging toward an ill-defined detente. New centers of influence had emerged in Europe, Japan, China, and OPEC countries. Even in the 1960s, one had begun to hear less of bipolarity, more of "multipolarity." In the 1970s, the world was awash with new possibilities. Communist parties were bidding for power in Western Europe. Everywhere, domestic politics was impinging on foreign affairs in new and different ways. As the world economy faltered, less was heard of alliance management and more of the management

of interdependence. The attention of leading industrial powers drifted toward issues of trade, resources, and money—from "high" to "low" politics, from grand strategy to economics.

In Third World countries, the trend ran in the opposite direction, from economics to politics—or seemed to. Statesmen and scholars in the West had begun to find the international politics of the Third World as interesting and challenging as its poverty. Developing countries were no longer mere objects of policy; some were important independent actors. Non-alignment had not caused many ripples at the Center. OPEC and the price weapon in resources did.

In the meantime, domestic trends in the U.S. had been making themselves felt. In the debate on Vietnam which began in the mid-60s, individual members of the Center participated on all sides, but when disruptions and violence struck the universities, Harvard included, the Center found itself staring across a wide credibility gap at a crowd of very confused and troubled faces. Created for postgraduate research in a period when students were notably apolitical, the Center suddenly emerged as an object of suspicion based on widespread misunderstanding of its purposes and workings. Radical folklorists fed the suspicion by portraying the Center as a kind of intellectual command post of imperialist reaction and repression.

In the fall of 1968, a well-drilled band of young non-Harvard radicals invaded the Center premises,

injuring several staff members and causing extensive property damage. Thereafter, for four years, the building at 6 Divinity Avenue was the scene of frequent protests, disruptions, and sporadic destruction. A powerful bomb explosion put the library and about half the offices out of commission for several months. Harvard students took little or no part in the violence, but many joined the protesters. So did a handful of junior faculty.

After four years, peace returned to the University. But peace brought another kind of problem. Disclosures of Watergate and the Government's undercover operations abroad seemed to produce among students a kind of numbed indifference toward government in general and foreign policy in particular. That posed a special challenge to the University, and especially to the Center for International Affairs.

Less directly, the changing moods affected the Center in still another way. The war, urban violence, racial unrest, and the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy were causing Americans to re-examine their priorities. One consequence was a marked decrease of foundation funding for international studies, in favor of increased support for programs with a domestic orientation. The downturn came at the very time when the last of the unrestricted grants that had helped sustain the Center through the sixties were being drawn down.

These were testing years. While



dealing with formidable new intellectual challenges in a period of sweeping change in world conditions, the Center had also to re-examine its role and functions in the University, particularly its relations with students. And it had to do all this in circumstances of financial stringency to which it was decidedly unaccustomed.

The Center responded with a number of innovations. It diversified its programs. It forged new links with Faculty members. It created new constituencies of students and of groups outside the University. There were continuities, of course. But from 1969 or thereabouts, change was in the saddle.

This is graphically illustrated in the lengthening list and growing variety of Center seminars and research commitments. There has been an increased emphasis on economics, and, with mounting protectionist pressures and the weakening of the Bretton Woods arrangements, especially on the politics of trade and money. Energy problems, commodity flows, North-South international relations, and regional politics gained places on the Center's agenda. Studies were made of the ways in which opinion groups form and mobilize to influence foreign policy. A group of scholars organized a seminar on conflict in democratic societies. Another seminar focused on American foreign policy in changing conditions; another, on the dynamics and management of international conflicts.

In 1971, the Center established

a new category of some 50 Faculty Associates, who provide closer links with many departments and professional schools. The role of younger faculty, especially, has been enlarged and deepened. They now play leading roles in research and seminars, and two of them participate as members of the Executive Committee in the governance of the Center.

At the same time, Student Associates joined the Center roster—Ph.D. candidates writing dissertations, and undergraduates preparing senior theses, in international affairs. Today there are some 40 of them, and a graduate student representative sits on the Executive Committee.

The Fellows group has grown. Where there were 12 Fellows in 1958-59, and only 14 in 1968-69, there were 21 this past year. They are younger than formerly, and represent a broader spectrum of cultures and professional concerns. The trend has been accelerated by creation of a new breed of Associate Fellows, political leaders for the most part, whose current involvement in affairs permits them to join the Center only for brief periods of one to three months.

The Center's contacts with business, labor, and the communications media have multiplied. Thoughtful leaders from the private sector had occasionally participated by invitation in the early work on arms control and transnational studies. In recent years, seminars on Canada, energy, and international trade and finance attracted more of them. In each of

the past three summers, the Center has sponsored and provided faculty direction for a week-long workshop on the politics of the international economy, designed especially for this new constituency. A two-day meeting on Mexico supplemented this program in the spring of 1978. Workshops on Brazil, Venezuela, and Canada are under consideration.

To strengthen its financial base in a period of tight money, the Center in 1976 embarked on an effort to develop new sources of funds. The first results have been encouraging.

In this strenuous and fast-moving era, twenty years is a respectable period of time to test whether a new institution has the strength, durability, and inner resources to renew itself as circumstances change. The Center has passed this test. It shows none of the tell-tale signs of aging, the flabby tone and sluggish responses that warn of institutional decay. On the contrary, it is bursting with energy and ideas.

The academic year 1977-78 has been a highly productive one, as the following pages describing the research and publications will show. It has also been a year of relative stability after a decade of ferment. It has given us an interval to assess recent changes and place them in perspective.

The Center's program is more differentiated, more nuanced than it was two decades, or even one decade ago. It reflects the world as we perceive it today. Seen as a whole, the program is also less



structured than before. This is perhaps not the best time for the hedgehog, who seeks to know a big thing. It is preeminently a time for foxes, who know many things.

Yet recurringly, an institution like the Center must seek a thematic structure in some sort of conceptual framework, however tentative it must be in the uncertain state of our art and times. The very search itself helps to fix boundaries, locate critical issues, and define priorities. It helps us to know and declare what we at the Center collectively are, and what we intend.

At 6 Divinity Avenue, we have been discussing these matters rather insistently. No over-arching theme, or set of themes, is in prospect, but the time is ripe for a seminar designed to involve several senior Faculty members in a common search for connecting threads. A promising era for advance is the area where foreign and domestic politics intersect. The growing significance of this intersection has been highlighted by research of transnational phenomena, comparative politics, bureaucratic and ethnic politics, and the domestic sources of foreign policy. Today, one takes it for granted that a state, in its international behavior, interacts not only with other states, but with a bewildering tangle of forces operating outside traditional channels.

In this context, several senior members of the Executive Committee are taking joint responsibility in 1978-79 for a re-organized seminar on American Foreign Policy. They

include Stanley Hoffmann and two colleagues who returned in the summer of 1978 from service in Washington—Samuel Huntington from the National Security Council, and Raymond Vernon from the Treasury. Later, they were joined by Joseph Nye, who relinquished his State Department post in January 1979. Still later, Robert Bowie, also on leave for government service, may join the group.

The new seminar on American Foreign Policy will focus on the growing interpenetration of foreign and domestic affairs. Drawing on the insights of those returning from Washington, as well as those who have remained at the University, it will spawn ideas for further research to clarify the tasks that a government in an open society like ours faces in its effort to construct and carry out a steady, purposeful foreign policy in modern conditions. This is a central issue, and one sends a rising awareness of it. As Stanley Hoffmann has written, today's world "raises a formidable challenge to the diplomacy of a country with no other experience than isolation or supremacy. American institutions and instincts have created their own obstacles. . ."

The Center stands at the confluence of several promising streams of events. A new generation of students, sadder and perhaps wiser than their recent predecessors, is taking a renewed constructive interest in foreign affairs. There seems to be a growing concern for international research and teaching on the part of the University's

Faculty and Administration, and of their counterparts in other institutions. There are signs, too, that the foundations and the Federal Government are beginning to weigh what more they might do to encourage and facilitate these trends. Finally, the Center has moved to nearby Coolidge Hall (1737 Cambridge Street), which will serve as headquarters for a number of the University's international activities. There will be opportunities for closer collaboration with Harvard's regional centers and programs, and with the Institute for International Development. Research, seminars, and workshops will all be enriched. Joint programs to serve the rising need for continued education are likely.

The Center's flexibility, its capacity for innovation, and the multiple strengths that it has developed in responding to profound and persistent change, equip it to play a significant role in what promises to be a new flowering of international studies at Harvard and generally throughout the country in the years ahead.

We have been lucky in our directors, and the luck is holding. Robert Bowie (1958-72) and Raymond Vernon (1973-77) led the Center with skill bordering on wizardry. Samuel Huntington, who assumed the directorship on September 1, 1978, knows the business. He has been a member of the Executive Committee since 1962, and served as Acting Director in the spring of 1976.

Sally Cox, Executive Officer from



1972, kept the Center's administration lean and efficient. In a brazen act of piracy, a rival power in the University recently made her an offer that she could not refuse. Learning from that friendly example, we pirated David Maxson from another Faculty. He has been serving as Executive Officer since August 1, 1978, with added responsibility for the Center's development program.

BENJAMIN H. BROWN

Fundação Cuidar o Futuro

