

Rashid Khalidi

Working Session 3: The Militarisation of the Mediterranean and the Middle East (second day)

I do not believe that if there is a nuclear confrontation between the superpowers, it will be in Europe. It will rather begin in some Third World spot. The most serious approaches to confrontations between the superpowers have been in the Middle East. The first use of the hot line was in 1967. There was the famous nuclear alert in 1973, and something which is not recognised by most people is the close proximity that existed between US and Soviet combat forces in Lebanon and Syria in the aftermath of the Lebanese war (1982). This was a very easy target for any third party who wanted to start an enormous conflagration. All of these things are indicative of the potential danger in the Middle East, and I would like to make a couple of points about this.

This first is that in the Middle East we have a profound long-lasting regional conflict where international polarisation matches the regional polarisation. Let me explain this point with the help of another particularly dangerous conflict. If we look at the Iran/Iraq war by way of contrast, we find that Iran and Iraq are engaged in a protracted regional conflict. There is, however, much less danger to world peace because both of the superpowers are in effect on the same side. Both are directly or indirectly supporting the Iraqis, and both are loth to see the Iranians win. The regional polarisation is not matched by the East-West polarisation. In the Middle East, on the other hand, the last three wars have seen a very clear correspondence between the international polarisation, East and West, and regional polarisation. That wasn't the case in 1948, and that wasn't the case in 1956. In those wars both superpowers were in effect on the same side. In 1948 both of them were more or less on the side of Israel. In 1956 both of them were more or less against the British, French and Israelis. Since 1967, however, there has been a polarisation, and I think that's very significant. This is an intense regional conflict where the superpowers will wind up in effect on the opposite sides. This is the first reason this conflict has very dangerous potentials.

The second point -- and this is what distinguishes things here from many other regions -- is that there are no rules of conduct between the superpowers. If we look at other potential areas of combat, for example the Koreas, the East Asian theatre in general; the High Seas; around Cuba; and certainly in Europe, over several decades tacit or formal and in some cases treaty relationships have been developed whereby each superpower has in effect clarified what can and what cannot be done by the other. The rules of the game have been specified. In many cases there is an informal agreement and in some cases they are actually ratified by treaties. If American and Soviet ships cross paths in the High Seas there is a routine. World War III is most unlikely to start at sea. It could happen, but it is most unlikely. For much of the East Asian region the same is true. Certainly the same is true for Europe. The enormous armed camps are unlikely to accidentally collide. You are not going to have a Balkan pre-World War I situation in Europe, but in the Middle East there are no rules. There are absolutely no rules of the game. That was what was so dangerous about the simultaneous presence of the superpowers' forces in the wake in the Lebanese crisis. Nobody knew what the limits were. Neither had had experience in that situation and anything could have happened. This is one of the elements that really distinguishes this regional conflict. When linked with what I previously mentioned, it makes it in my opinion the greatest danger.

Working group 3



Let me go on to another thing that is linked to this and is a problem in itself; the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region. We have seen in other conflicts that when one side has nuclear weapons in a regional conflict -- I am thinking of India, China and soon, perhaps, Pakistan -- then the other side will try to obtain them. I am afraid that we are moving in that direction in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel has a nuclear potential, and it almost certainly has weapons. There are three perhaps four actors on the other side which are close to having that potential; perhaps by the end of the decade, perhaps sooner. The Israeli raid on Baghdad in 1981 proves that Israel believed that Iraq was moving in that direction. Whether or not in fact the Iraqis had such potential is not the point. Israel believed that they did, and it cannot be denied that there is such a potential.

Now this obviously all began with Israel, but the possibility of greater proliferation is both a menace to peace in itself -- in the sense that a local conflict could easily escalate once nuclear weapons were present on both sides -- and an exacerbation of the danger of the superpower presence. If indeed both sides do obtain nuclear weapons or if in response to the presence of nuclear weapons on one side the other side tries to obtain them from the other superpower -- for example if in response to the Israeli possession of nuclear weapons the Arab countries try to obtain them from the Soviet Union -- we have a further level of danger in the superpower confrontation in the region. For in addition to the possibility that the local actors could use these weapons, we would have the possibility that the superpowers could move closer to a nuclear confrontation with one another.

And at the very least the presence of the continuation of this trend toward proliferation makes the issue much more serious. I would suggest that the two issues which I have talked about, the superpower confrontation and the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the region, irrespective of everything else in the region, deserve to be treated as issues of highest priority by the European peace movement. Next to the nuclear issue itself, this is the most important issue. When you talk about the scenario where these horrible weapons are going to be used, you have to talk about the Middle East. If you talk about anything else before that there is a mistake in priorities. This should be your second priority, at worst your third priority.

If it is going to happen, it will happen there, and if something else is going to happen involving nuclear weapons it is going to happen there. India/Pakistan/China is another region you should be concerned about because there too you have some kind of correspondence between a local conflict and superpower interests, and there too you have nuclear weapons potential. So if you say that that triangle is more important, I won't necessarily disagree with you, although it is probably more stable than the Middle East. It should be apparent that the only way to deal with these two issues or the other issue which we were asked to address -- the issue of the arms race in the Middle East -- is through a comprehensive regional settlement. If the Arab-Israeli conflict is not diffused, peace is obviously going to be threatened, and the kind of piecemeal, stopgap measures the United States has engaged in during the last decade will not and have not decreased the danger of war. They have not decreased the danger of confrontation between the superpowers. They have not decreased the danger of proliferation.


Let me make clear what I'm saying. Disengagement agreements, the Arab and Egyptian-Israeli peace have diffused a portion of the set-up of the



regional conflict, but we still have nuclear proliferation or the potential for it. We had a major war in 1982 after the peace treaty. We still have enormous expenditures on weapons. The only country that has decreased its weapons expenditures is Egypt. Everybody else is spending more. I don't even think the Egyptian-Israeli peace can necessarily resist regional pressures if a settlement is not achieved. So, whatever positive things can be said about the previous disengagement agreements and the peace treaty brought about by American mediation, they have not solved the problem, and I think it should also be clear that this is also not even the way to solve the problem. What is left of the problem, I think, has got to be addressed comprehensively. It is the height of folly to assume that at this stage it is possible to further separate the pedals of this rose and deal with two of the actors and one small portion of the issue. You can't do that anymore. There are now four or five regional actors whose interests and problems are so intertwined that it is impossible to separate them. The regional problem is so tightly linked to the superpower confrontation that it is impossible for one superpower alone to act. You cannot bring about a settlement between Israel and Jordan, for example, one of the prime illusions in Washington, and to some extent an illusion in Israel. It's absolutely out of the question. You must include Syria. The problem is not between Israel and Jordan for heavens sake. The danger of confrontation is really between Syria and Israel. If you are interested in world peace, in regional peace, in people not being killed, in the arms race being brought to a halt, and in an end to nuclear proliferation, then looking at just a Jordanian-Israeli agreement doesn't even address the main issue. In fact it may lead to further conflict, where conflict might otherwise not have erupted.

Trying to address the issue without the Palestinians is obviously impossible. Yet it is the primary consideration in Washington. This is something that should be condemned, opposed and described as the height of folly. I don't think that the extent to which this is self-delusion is fully apparent. I don't think it's fully apparent in Israel, I certainly don't think it is fully apparent in the United States. I think that here the light of reason emanating from Europe might yet penetrate. This may seem obvious to all of us sitting around this table, but believe me it is not obvious in the United States. Every week, every month further nonsense is poured into the public media and public discourse about how you can have a settlement without the Soviets, without the Syrians, and without Palestinians. Self-deception doesn't die very easily. So I would suggest that these are all absolutely essential areas and the only way to address them, the only way to address superpower confrontation, the only way to address the possibility of nuclear proliferation and the only way to address the whole issue of the arms race is thorough support for a comprehensive settlement. As far as the contribution of the superpowers to militarisation in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, the first issue is arms sales, which you can only deal with through a settlement, since as long as there is conflict, people are going to need weapons. Thus you must deal with the causes of conflict and help to bring about a settlement. Then possibly you can bring up the arms sales.

The other thing that is at issue is the Mediterranean as a scene of superpower competition, irrespective of Arab-Israeli considerations, and here there are some problems. The primary arena is the naval balance in the Mediterranean between the two superpowers. It has been recently visible because of the current American manoeuvres off the coast of Libya. This aspect has great potential danger, both for a conflict between superpowers and for conflicts between one superpower and local powers. This is similar to the situation when the United States was off the coast of Lebanon supporting of the Gemayal regime, which brought on an American-Syrian



confrontation. This is going to be complicated very soon by the perspective completion of the first real Soviet aircraft carrier. The first one, in the Black Sea, is launched but not yet operational and there is a second one on the way. Soon you will have a potential for the Soviet Union -- which the United States has always had -- of projecting power into unfriendly situations. Let me explain what I mean. Either superpower can obviously send troops to a country that is friendly. There is no problem with that. It is just a matter of an airbridge. For the last decade the Soviets have had that capability. The U.S. has always had it. Soon, however, the Soviet Union will have air cover which will allow them to project power into hostile situations. The U.S. has 13, and will soon have 15 of these carrier groups which enable to do that; each can put 80 - 100 planes over a landing site and in effect invade a hostile country, or put forces ashore, in situations where it doesn't have support. The Soviet Union will soon have that potential. These things are dangerous, not just because of the possibility that they will be used, but to the extent to which they are tokens or symbols of superpower influence. There is a good possibility that you will soon see the Soviets stationing one of these vessels in the Mediterranean, just as the United States has several of them there now. When you have a carrier group you have an enormous investment of superpower prestige and an enormous concentration of superpower power. That means that the existing level of potential conflict in the Mediterranean is going to go up several notches.

Let me conclude with the role of Europe and the peace movements in all of this. It should be clear, stating it bluntly, that there has to be opposition in Europe to further piecemeal, partial, band-aid solutions to the Arab-Israeli conflict. There has to be opposition to the idea of somehow separating one or another party. You can't make a deal without Syria; you can't make a deal without the Palestinians; you can't make a deal without the United States and the Soviet Union both being involved. The United States and Soviet Union both have a potential for a clash in the Middle East, and it is a vital interest for Europe to see to it that this does not take place. The U.S. is the strongest of the two superpowers, certainly in the Middle East. The U.S. has allies in the region, notably Israel, and Europe is closer to the U.S. For all these reasons your leverage probably greater with the U.S., but the Soviet role is important too, and I don't think that it should be ignored by the European peace movement.

Some people argue that one thing we can do is to cut off arms to the local belligerents. The only problem with that is if you don't stop the conflict you are simply going to push them into a greater dependency on the superpowers. In the balance it is better to stop arms trade from Europe, but don't think if you do that without addressing the conflict, that the effect of your campaign will be positive. You may in fact increase the dependency of this or that local actor on one of the superpowers. Don't think if you don't sell weapons it will solve anything. The only real solution is an end to the conflict.

In conclusion, western peace movements, I think, should above all focus on the Middle East. I don't think there is anything that is more important except the European nuclear issue. If anything is going to happen, involving nuclear weapons, it is most likely that it is going to grow out of the Middle East conflict. This problem between Arabs and Israelis is something that is not going away. It is something that is not going to get better. It is most likely to get worse, and we are going to have another regional war, if something is not done about it. I think it should be one of your main priorities, it should not be your number 27th, it should be the number two or three priority of the peace movement to bring about a just peace in the Middle East.



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VORSTAND

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To all participants of the Peace
Forum of the Ecumenical Association
of Academies and Laity Centres in
Europe from September 3-6, 1987 in
Driebergen.

29.7.87


Dear Colleagues and Friends!

Please find enclosed preparatory papers for the Working Groups of
our Peace Forum for which you registered. They will give you
a brief insight of the planning and thinking of the moderators
and responsible persons for these working groups. We hope they
will help in your own personal preparation.

Please take these papers as a proposal. The groups at Driebergen
will be free to decide in which direction their discussion should
go, which point of view they want to emphasize and to be deepened.

Looking forward to meeting all of you.

Yours Sincerely,



Dr. Fritz Erich Anhelm

Encl.



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Juli 1987

FRIEDENSFORUM (Driebergen/Holland)

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Die Arbeitsgruppe 3 möchte bei ihren Überlegungen von der Situation des Mittelmeerraumes ausgehen.

Dabei soll der Mittelmeerraum als eigenständiges kulturelles Gebiet wahrgenommen werden, in dem es - trotz der Konflikte von Ideologien und Religionen - eine historische Verwandtschaft der Kultur, Lebensweise und der Erinnerungen gibt.

Wie geht der Norden mit der Tatsache dieses "anderen Europa" um?

In diesem Rahmen sollen behandelt werden:

- Sicherheitspolitische Überlegungen
(dazu die beiliegenden Papiere)
- Wirtschaftliche Überlegungen
- Tourismus und Migration
- Entstehen eines neuen Bewußtseins (vor allem unter der jungen Generation)
- Konsequenzen für unsere Bildungsarbeit.

July, 1987

Fundação Cuidar o Futuro

PEACE FORUM (Driebergen/Holland)

Working Group 3 wants to take as a starting point of the discussion the situation in the Mediterranean Region.

The Mediterranean should be dealt with as an autonomous cultural region, having- in spite of conflicts between ideologies and religion- a common historical relationship of culture, life-style and memory.

How does the North react to the fact of this "other Europe"?

In this framework the discussions should deal with:

- Considerations on security- policy
(see enclosed papers)
- Economical considerations
- Tourism and Migration
- The coming of a new awareness (for instance among the younger generation)
- Consequences for our educational work



Israel's bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis; the highjacking of the Achille Lauro, followed by the US diversion of an "official" Egyptian aircraft to the NATO base in Sigonella, Sicily; the acts of terrorism in Rome and Vienna; the trial of strength between the United States and Libya; the interception of a Libyan civilian aircraft by the Israeli air force, etc. are all characteristic of how the Mediterranean is turning into an explosive powder keg.

The war scenarios are coming closer to Europe, particularly Southern Europe (Kadafi's threats of retaliation against American bases in Sicily and Naples). The Mediterranean is becoming the epicentre of international crisis once again and the perspective of a political solution to the Palestinian question is fading.

I. Militarisation of the Mediterranean.

A. A preliminary list of the permanence and extension of the tensions and conflicts can be established:

- * the Greek-Turkish dispute;
- * continuation of the Cypriot problem;
- * tensions on the Syrian-Israeli border;
- * the Lebanese question, in particular Southern Lebanon;
- * militarisation of Egypt and Libya;
- * the conflict in the Western Sahara and Morocco's desire to impose a military solution;
- * extension of terrorism in the Mediterranean due to the dispersion of Palestinian structures, linked to the absence of a perspective for a political solution; and, above all,
- * the Israeli refusal to accept a peace process to resolve Palestinian problem.

The atmosphere of conflict seems all the more dangerous since it is an integral part of the economic, social and ideological crisis in Mediterranean countries, favouring the rise of aggressive nationalist tendencies and fanatic religious currents.

B. The arms trade in the Middle East is still flourishing:

- * The Middle East receives more than half of the arms sold to the Third World;
- * Military spending in countries bordering the Mediterranean, excluding Italy and France, amounts to about \$ 100,000 million dollars a year;
- * The military strength of these countries has risen from 2,100,000 men in uniform to 3,500,000 men in ten years (1972-1982).
- * These same countries possess 26,000 tanks, 5,000 fighter planes, and many frigates and missile-launching corvettes.
- * The exporting countries are essentially the four nuclear powers (US, USSR, France and Great Britain) followed by Italy and Spain.

These weapons are becoming more and more sophisticated. The United States sells their most sophisticated weapons to only seven Third World countries. Among these are, in order, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and, in seventh position, Morocco. A second group of countries (13) receive items such as sidewinder air-to-air and Maverick air-to-ground missiles, F-SE fighters and M-60 A tanks. Included in this group are Bahrain,

Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Tunisia. (According to Merip Reports, February 1983). For its part, the USSR provides Syria with high-technology weapons, in particular, Sam-5 ground-to-air missiles, T-62 and T-72 tanks, Scud and Frog rockets. According to Michael Klare, Merip Reports, February 1983, "These deliveries have transformed the combat environment in the Middle East into a high-risk battlefield of the sort we would expect in another European war."

C. The Actual Presence of the Superpowers.

The presence of the American and Soviet fleets in the Mediterranean is a known fact. The Sixth fleet has two aircraft carriers at its disposal. Each one possesses 90 aircraft (primarily F-14s), a cruiser, 14 frigates and fighter torpedo boats, five fighter submarines, etc. The Soviet fifth squadron consists of about 45 ships, including submarines. In addition to this naval presence, the United States can exploit the possibilities offered by about 200 bases established in the countries bordering the Mediterranean. The Soviets only have support bases in Syria.

The United States is at present strengthening its network of bases in Morocco, Egypt and Turkey. The two superpowers have recently reinforced the establishment of their military (or paramilitary) staff. For the United States this concerns above all the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For the USSR it concerns Syria (6000) and Libya.

As Michael Klare writes, "conventional arms transfers bind the fate of recipients to that of the supplier, thereby increasing the risk of superpower involvement in a Middle Eastern war. The big powers inevitably acquire a particular interest in the survival of regimes to which they have sold large quantities of their most advanced weapons (in particular) if there is any risk that the supplier's military centers will fall into the hands of an enemy."

D. The Nuclear Risk.

According to Michael Klare both the conventional arms trade and the production of arms in the country itself, Israel in particular, "facilitates the nuclear programme of local powers. Conventional arms transfers play an important accessory role in providing aspiring nuclear powers with the capacity of delivering nuclear attacks deep into enemy territory." (aircraft and missiles).

II. New Doctrines.

A. The extension of NATO's zone of intervention and the role of the RDF.

The ministers have stressed their common interest in the security, the stability and the sovereignty of countries outside the zone covered by NATO...Recognising that the objective of NATO is that of preserving the security of the Atlantic region, the ministers have come to realise that developments outside this zone could threaten the vital interests of the countries that form the Alliance. They have also recognised the need to increase the coordination of planning, noting that the authorities of the Alliance are preparing a report on the implication for NATO of American plan for the Rapid Deployment Force.

This long quote -- taken from the document which in December 1982 clarified and, in certain respects, redefined the role of the Atlantic Alliance -- contains three elements that give rise to more general



consideration of American military policy in the second half of the 1980s.

1. Extension of NATO's operative area. The document develops the concept of an active military role for the Alliance in areas external to the national territories of member countries. In other words, the United States, through NATO, intends to involve the European allies in an explicit policy of intervention.
2. The primacy of "vital interests." Military intervention by the allies may be necessary when and where "vital interests" of one or more of the NATO members are threatened. The same generic term -- vital interests -- foresees the possibility of an offensive military intervention against countries that conduct an economic and foreign policy deemed detrimental to the United States and its allies.
3. An offensive capability: the RDF. The third implication of the document is of a strictly tactical-strategic nature and concerns the relationship between the offensive systems of the European allies and the effect on them of the departure of US forces that form part of the RDF.

The emphasis on the relationship between European "vital interests" and the US Rapid Deployment Force constitutes a new development that merits a careful analysis of the new strategic framework adopted by NATO and the scenarios not only of wars currently being fought, but also wars in the future. In theory, the RDF must also be able to "solve" conflicts rapidly so as to prevent them from spreading. Consequently it should not be surprising that the RDF is equipped with tactical nuclear weapons whose use must not be excluded.

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Thus according to the doctrine which underlines the RDF, the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons seems to have been abandoned. Instead, the new doctrine proposes an integration of conventional and nuclear weapons. The development of military strategy of this kind stems from the assumption that conflicts in which the United States and its allies will be involved during the next few years will be geographically and politically limited. In affect the threat of Soviet involvement is used as an ideological justification for an interventionist policy applicable to areas of "vital interest" to the United States.

The Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the entire Mediterranean basin constitute possible sites for intervention and the new military strategy of the U.S. explicitly conceives of them as such. It is in these areas that the theories which underline the RDF will be put into practice if the need arises.

In fact, as Christopher Pain of the Federation of American Scientists explains, the availability of a RDF makes it much easier for the United States to use military intervention in a situation which could otherwise be resolved through political or diplomatic means. This, therefore, makes it more or less likely that the interventionist tendencies of Washington will be translated into armed action. These interventions represent the most likely preliminaries for a confrontation which could rapidly degenerate to take on a general nuclear dimension.

Moreover, the RDF does not constitute an alternative to the use of nuclear weapons. It is, in fact, equipped with a part of the 17,000



tactical nuclear warheads available to the U.S. military structure as a whole.

B. The Role of Cruise Missiles in Comiso, Sicily.

The decision of the Italian government and NATO to deploy cruise missiles in Comiso is an integral part of these considerations and strategies. The base which occupies a central position in the Mediterranean and is equipped with missiles capable of hitting targets in both northern Africa and the Middle East represent the first concrete implementation of the strategy which we have been describing.

The deployment of missiles in Comiso, obviously not the most important factor in the present process of worldwide rearmament, still seems to be a particularly dangerous one due to the type of weapons systems and the geo-strategic considerations which have lead NATO to choose Sicily as a nuclear outpost in the Mediterranean. Thus the continued increase in military potential, particularly at sea; the technological and quantitative development of the military structures in the Mediterranean; the RDF and the Comiso missiles; and the strategic theories behind them are constantly building up the risk of a war, the "local and limited" nature of which can in no way be guaranteed.

In addition, the explicit considerations of the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict of this nature modify substantially the foreseen dimensions of the conflict and substitute a qualitative strategic leap in which the various conflicts, even if they manage to maintain a "local" character, would insert themselves in a strategy of global domination. The new strategies in other words, view local intervention from a perspective of hegemony on a worldwide scale. From such a vantage point, diverse conflicts, the acquisition of weapon systems suitable to a variety of different situations and the development of various operational doctrines merge to form a single "deadly connection" -- the phenomena recently analysed by sectors of the US peace movement.

The Role for Europe.

Faced with the policy which the United States wants to impose on NATO, European countries have reacted in a way which is more and more novel: On the one hand they reluctantly accepted the developments in US doctrine -- of Williamsburg -- and at the same time they intend to acquire comparable military equipment in order to contest the US spheres of influence, particularly in the Mediterranean. The result is an increase in the militarisation of the region and an accentuation of the contradictions between the US and its European allies. This is exactly what happened in the Lebanese "adventure" during which France, Great Britain and Italy participated in the multi-national force.

The same process is apparent in the constitution of a RDF by different European countries. France is building its Force d'Action Rapide which should number 47,000 men, divided over several existing divisions. Some 5,000 men are forward deployed in Dgibuti, together with 14 naval ships. The British RDF would be tiny in comparison with the US versions -- about 5,000 men to be fully operational sometime in 1985.

Italy announced in the Defence White Paper in the autumn of 1984 that it was projecting a Forza di Interrento Rapido (FOIR) for rapid deployment on national territory and potentially for international security tasks. In May 1985 General Luigi Claigaris presented a NATO sponsored study hour to realise this Italian RDF.



More recently the countries of Europe seem concerned for economic political and strategic reasons, about the Israeli-American refusal to make a serious commitment toward a peace process in the Middle East. They contest the one-sided and adventuristic nature of the American (and Israeli) policy. This, above all, concerns European countries bordering on the Mediterranean and especially Italy. This debate leads to the conception of balance in the Mediterranean. Will this be achieved through a form of global military control -- position of the United States and Israel -- or through a political solution to the most danger conflict, that is, the Palestinian question?

This decisive confrontation is linked to the solution to be found to the extention of terrorism. The support given by the Italian government to the Jordanian-Palestinian plan shows its desire to assume a function of mediation and peace which implies:

1. support for the leadership of Yasser Arafat within the PLO and his actual recognition as the leader of the Palestinian people;
2. a political conflict with the Israeli government's line;
3. a desire to involve the other European countries in this process;
4. and consequently, tension with the United States.

Furthermore, a new diplomatic vitality from the USSR faced with uneffective American policies reinforces the conditions for increasing pressure to hold an international conference for the resolution of the Middle East question.

European peace forces should contribute by making Mediterranean opinion understood more clearly -- that, in order to preserve peace in the region, a Palestinian state must be created on the West Bank, both as the only possible way of guaranteeing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, and to save Israel, and to put an end to terrorism. They must help to create the conditions for Israeli-Palestinian dialogue as a necessary means of involving them in a peace process. The very fact of existing as a receptive structure for this double dialogue which must be open to the public as possible the promoting of the conclusions of these dialogues constitutes the tasks of top priority for the peace movement in Southern Europe.

Their next meeting planned for July in Livorno (Italy) should allow for a first significant step in this direction.

